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Ahlen: The Seventeenth Century Dogmaticians as Philosophers

The Seventeenth Century
Dogmaticians as Philosophers
By A. C. AHLEN
Professor Ahlt:n presented this paper as a contribution to
Symposium on Lutheran Orthodoxy at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri, on June 9, 1958. It also appeared in the Nor1b,,,.s111rn S11mi11tfl'1 B•ll11ti11,
July 1958, and is published here with his kind permission.]
[EDJTOJtlAL NOTB:

T

o assert that philosophy and theology are not identical would
obviously be unnecessary in addressing myself to the present
group; but to remind you that there are vast areas of common
interest shared by these rwo disciplines is probably not superfluous.
Living as we do in a time when reason is often ridiculed and up-tothe-minute theologians present highly rationalized arguments in
favor of antirational views, we need to remind ourselves that philosophy is inescapable. The moment we reflect critically upon our
experiences and beliefs, we begin to philosophize.
While we thus recognize the inevitability of philosophy, we need
to recall that there is no Christian philosophy per se. Some points
of view, e.g., materialism, naturalism, agnosticism, are not compatible with the Christian faith. Others, however, are: Augustine,
Anselm, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Berkeley, and
Kierkegaard can all claim a place within the Christian framework;
Bruno, Hobbes, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Marx, Spencer, and Russell
cannot. Still others, of whom we may take Kant and James as
random examples, have propounded systems more or less compatible
with the Christian faith. All of this is a commonplace matter.
But it is just the ordinary facts that are overlooked when zeal
for a particular position becomes dominant.
Philosophy asks fundamental questions about the nature of
reality, of value, of man and his destiny. The Christian faith
supplies answers; theology attempts to systematize them. Are these
rationally defensible, or at least, can they be shown to lie beyond
rational criticism? It is here that the work of the philosopher and
the theologian overlap. It is here that the scholastic-whether
medieval or 17th century-has labored. We may criticize his
often-demonstrated narrowness and his intolerance; but we must
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admit that his objective was laudable. I am well aware that we
are often vociferously reminded that the Christian faith cannot be
propositionalized. To be sure, no statement is the equivalent of the
reality for which it stands; but neither can we communicate in any
meaningful way without recourse to propositions. Even the statement noted above is itself a proposition.
The 17th century has sometimes been spoken of as the Lutheran
Church's medieval period. The remark is usually intended to be
opprobrious, suggesting that this was an age of brutality during
which the theologians having the upper hand fought among themselves, persecuted dissenters, and distorted or trivialized the Christian
faith. The defects of the age are undeniable; they do not spring
from the basic objectives of these thinkers but rather from the
social conditions of the times.
It would be possible to dispose of the 17th-century dogmaticians
briefly by describing them as for the most part Aristotelian
rationalists who had taken the Book of Concord as their material
and sought by means of deductive logic to produce an all-inclusive
theological system on that basis. That, though true enough, would
be an oversimplification of our project, just as a detailed study
of their philosophical technique applied to all their problems
would be prevented by its magnitude. We shall have to content
ourselves with a brief discussion of their procedures in dealing
with certain representative questions in the philosophy of religion.
Before doing this, however, a brief presentation of a few biographical data are in order.
Abraham Calov (1612-1685), sometime professor at Wittenberg, is often spoken of as the stanchest defender of Orthodox
Lutheranism against any and all critics within and without the
church. John Gerhard (1582-1637), professor at Jena, though
equally a champion of orthodox Lutheranism, was of a far more
irenic disposition than Calov. Matthew Hafenreffer ( 1561-1619),
professor at Tiibingen, sought to use the then newer methods in
philosophy in his exposition of Lutheranism. His work became
popular and for a considerable time served as the official textbook
in the Church of Sweden. David Hollaz (1648-1713), pastor
in Pomerania, is generally spoken of as the last of the great orthodox
dogmaticians of this period. Leonhard Hutter (1563-1616),
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol30/iss1/16
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another Wittenberg professor, has been designated a second edition
of Luther; the justification of the label is problematical. John
Quenstedt ( 1617-85) is unique among these persons in that
he had served as professor of philosophy at Wittenberg, becoming
a teacher of theology in 1660. The designation attached to him,
the bookkeeper of orthodox Lutheranism, suggests faithfulness,
scrupulous carefulness, and- lack of originality.
Consideration of these champions of orthodoxy would be incomplete without a brief mention of two prominent opponents. John
Valentine Andreae (1586----1654), grandson of one of the coauthors of the Formula of Concord, emphasized ethics and discipline
as well as docuine. Though not going ro the same length as the
man to be mentioned, he suessed the desirability of mutual recognition among denominations on the basis of the fundamental
Christian beliefs. His pseudonymous polemic against the mystical
vagaries of his own time has undeservedly secured for him the
reputation of founding the Rosicrucians.
George Calixt (1586-1656), professor at Helmstedt, deplored
the acrimonious polemic of his own day and became himself the
object of bitter opposition, especially from Calov. Calixt, usually
associated with the term syncretism, has been accused of both crypcoRomanism and crypto-Calvinism. He argued that a distinction must
be made between fundamental (essential to salvation) and nonfundamental teachings. On the basis of the former the different
denominations should recognize one another. His division of docuine inro antecedents (religious facts that can be known by reason
without divine revelation), constituents ( the true fundamentals,
basic matter of faith ascertainable through revelation alone) and
consequents (deductions from the two foregoing) is not only interesting; but it also shows how, from the standpoint of philosophic
method, similar techniques were used both by the orthodox and
their supposedly heterodox opponents.
Concerning the relationship of faith and reason, of theology
and philosophy, the old dogmaticians have much to say that makes
them p,rson11• non grlllll• to the contemporary exponents of a blatant fideism as well as to some of their own contemporaries. Daniel
Hoilman (d. 1611) had echoed the sentiments of Averroes and
cenain nominalists: "Philosophy is hostile to theology; what is
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1959
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true in philosophy is false in theology." To this Calov replied:
''That philosophy is not oppased to theology. and is by no means
tO be rejected as brutish, terrene, impure. diabolical, we thus
demonstrate: ( 1) Because the true agrees with the true and does
not antagonize it. But what is known by the light of nature is no
less true than what is revealed in Scripture; ( 2) because natural
and philosophical knowledge has its origin from God; ( 3) because
philosophy leads us to the knowledge of God." 1
"\Ve must distinguish between a real and apparent contradiction.
The maxims of philosophy and the conclusions of theology do not
really contradict each other. but only appear to do so; for they
either do not discuss the same subject, or they do not describe the
same mode, condition, or relation to it. (Ibid., I. 74)
So also Quenstedt. "Philosophy and the principles of reason are
not indeed contrary to theology ... but there is a very great difference between those things that are revealed in Scripture and those
which are known by the light of nature. . . . The formal principle of
reason no one rejects . . . its material principles no wise man
accepts.2
Ochers could be cited with the same results. To sum up. divine
revelntion in the realm of the supernatural must be the basis of
faith. In matters pertaining to the natural, human reason must
judge. Rightly understood. a conflict between them is impassible.
Says Gerhard, "Sound reason is not opposed to the faith if we
accept as such that which is truly and properly so-called, namely.
that which does not transcend the limits of its sphere and does
not arrogate to itself decisions in regard to the mysteries of faith,
or which, enlightened by the Word and sanctified by the Holy Spirit,
does not follow its own principles in the investigation of the mysteries of the faith but the light of the Word and the guidance
of the Holy Spirit." 3
In other words we have here a sharp line of demarcation drawn
between the natural and the supernatural. The latter is made up
of mysteries beyond, but not contrary to, reason. Hence the laws
of abstraa thought are applicable in all cases. No repudiation of the
1
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I
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lot:or•m 1hnlo1i1:o,wm, I, 68.
Thnlo1i11 tlill«lit:0-floln,it:11, I, 43.
Loci 1h•olo1it:i, II, 3 72.

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol30/iss1/16

4

Ahlen: The Seventeenth Century Dogmaticians as Philosophers
100

THE 17TH CENTUR.Y DOGMATICANS AS PHILOSOPHERS

Jaws of identity, of non-contradiction, and of excluded middle are
set forth here. Theology is no more a rejection of these than it
would be a suspension of the laws of mathematics because of the
fact that God is Triune. God is not one in the snme sense as He
is three.
The fundamental problem of any philosophy of religion is, of
course, the doctrine of God. While emphasizing the inadequacy
of nonrevelational knowledge of the Deity ( "The natural knowledge of God is not sufficient to secure salvation . . . nor can anyone
be redeemed by it alone," Quenstedt, I, 261), nevertheless the
17th century dogmaticians follow the lead of the ancients and the
main succession of the medieval dunkers. Man has an innate knowledge of God. In support of this is quoted Rom. 1: 19 and 2 :14, 15.
Moreover, the very fact that man has a capacity for distinguishing
good and evil, that he has a feeling of responsibility and a conscience, constitute further indications of God's existence. (Ibid.,
p.253)
Man has also a natural knowledge of God wbicb is derived from
observation of the external world and from the events of history.
A detailed discussion of these well-known arguments I deem unnecessary at this point. This knowledge of God is not purely theoretical; it has a practical objective. Says Calov: "The use of the
natural knowledge of God is ( 1) pedagogical, for seeking after the
true God, who has manifested Himself through the Scriptures in the
church; ( 2) paedeutical, for directing morals and external discipline
both within and without the church; ( 3) didactic, because it contributes to the exposition and illustration of the Scriptures if it be
rightly employed." ( Calov, II, 40)
In all this it is necessary tO bear in mind that man's natural
capacities have been impaired by the Fall, hence what we have is
but a faint recollection of what once was. Gerhard speaks of this
knowledge as "sparks and scintillations of that clear light which
shone with full splendor in the mind of man before the Fall."
( Gerhard, I, 93)
The doctrine of the Trinity provides another situation in which
d1ese thinkers made use of their previously noted techniques. The
doetrine itself is a mystery; however, once given in revelation it can
be shown tO be not absurd. "Among Christians, instructed in the
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1959
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Word of God and embracing by faith the mystery of the Trinity,
this can be proved by natural reasons" (ibid., III, 224). We might
pause to note here that the dogmaticians could have gone farther
than they did. While the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be demonstrated after the manner of a geometrical proposition, it can be
shown to provide an answer to a question about God's nature that
a unitarian conception of the Deity leaves an even greater mystery.
A detailed discussion of the application of these methods to all
areas of theological knowledge is, as has already been said, out of
question. It is of particular interest, however, to note their treatment of the problem of human personality or soul. The latter,
says Gerhard (ibid., XVII, 147-150), can be shown to be probably immortal by natural reason; in suppart of this, arguments
from Plato and the older scholastics are adduced. The basic proof,
though, is to be found in revelation.
Summing up our rather superficial survey, we can say that the
17th century dogmaticians were supernaturalists: God, angels, man
as a spiritual entity, were to be sharply distinguished from other
forms of existence, and as such are not subject to the so-called laws
of nature ( observed uniformities). They were, accordingly, metaphysical dualists. Matter and spirit are ultimate realities reducible
to no other substance. They were rationalists. By means of reason,
though the latter, in common with all things human, has been corrupted by the Fall, man can obtain reliable knowledge of natural
phenomena. Man regenerated can also by the same instrument on
the basis of revelation arrive at reliable corollaries and conclusions.
We may deplore their intolerance, their palemical attitudes; we
may regret their failure to recognize that there is yet more light to
break forth from the Word. But we cannot do other than admire
their desire to think God's thoughts after Him. In an age that seeks
to obscure all distinctions and, weary of thought, seeks to hold on to
mutually contradictory propasitions in the same context and at the
same time, we need to be reminded of those who did not shirk
intellectual labor. God desires that His children should also love
Him with their entire minds. He desires that men should be
rational.
Minneapalis, Minn.
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